ABSTRACT Advancements in the Internet of Things promote edge computing, which provides enhanced IoT services. IoT applications remarkably benefit from deep learning (DL) based on neural networks. Considering edge nodes with the limited ability of processing, the small-scale compressive DL model is applicatively deployed into them. However, the model can expose the privacy of training dataset. Thus, the model should be regarded as confidential due to the sensitive training dataset when applied in commercial and security fields. In this paper, we design a deep-learning-based service provision system for protecting the privacy and enhancing services in edge computing. We propose a practical approach for building the private compressive DL model by incorporating differential privacy mechanism on the cloud server side. For protecting the privacy of training dataset, the approach is composed of the private dense training step and the private compressive training step, where differential privacy is used to construct the private pre-trained dense model and the private compressive model, respectively. The private compressive model with 1/9 of the dense model's size can be practically embedded into edge servers. Edge servers provide enhanced services to the near IoT devices. Finally, we mainly execute a set of experiments on MNIST dataset. Compared to the dense model with no privacy constraints and with differential privacy (train and test accuracies of 98.0% and 98.2%, 95.5%, and 97.2%, respectively), the private compressive model perturbation with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy (train and test accuracies of 96.3% and 95.8%) can achieve high utility while upholding tight privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancements in deep learning based on neural networks have led to breakthroughs in many modern artificial intelligence (AI) applications [1] . The deep learning models have been widely adopted by different kinds of service provision systems. These deep-learning-based services include image recognition [2] , [3] and speech recognition [4] , [5] , and language translation [6] , [7] .
Internet of Things (IoT) was first proposed in 1999 for supply chain management [8] . Recently, IoT has come to contribute to healthcare, home, environment, and transports [9] , [10] . As we know, IoT devices usually generate huge
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Juan Liu. volumes of complex data, specifically, multimedia data such as video, sounds, and images. The current neural networks, in particular with multiple hidden layers, perform extremely well for processing and analyzing these massive complex data. The superior performance of neural networks benefits from the capability of providing high accuracy results in learning high-level features from high-dimensional data. Hence, deep learning has been also utilized in many complex tasks for IoT services [11] , [12] . Most existing deep learning methods for IoT applications still depend on the centralized cloud architecture, where all the computing tasks are put on the cloud [13] . Due to the requirement of the fast speed of data transportation, the centralized cloud architecture with the limited bandwidth of the network is inefficient for processing VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ FIGURE 1. Extraction attack. The compressive model is deployed into the server. An adversary sends n queries denoted as (Q(x 1 ), . . . , Q(x n )) to the server. The server then returns n responses (R(x 1 ), . . . , R(x n )) to the adversary. According to these query-response pairs, the adversary may can learn a replicated model˜ with very similar performance as .
and analyzing these amounts of data from IoT devices [14] .
In particular, online learning applications are increasingly time-sensitive as the users' online activities rise [15] , [16] . The centralized cloud cannot satisfy their demand of very short response time.
With the development of IoT and the pressure on the network of the centralized cloud architecture, edge computing has emerged as a new computing paradigm for IoT applications. Edge computing is utilizing technologies to offload computing tasks from the centralized cloud to the edge node near IoT devices [17] , [18] . As mentioned previously, deep learning is appropriately utilized for IoT services. Therefore, IoT applications based on deep learning are desirable for processing complicated tasks in the edge computing environment. We consider the deep learning model can be deployed into edge nodes. Instead of the remote cloud, the edge nodes can process tasks for the near IoT devices. Thus, the edge nodes provide enhanced services for the near IoT devices. Unfortunately, edge nodes are limited by their power, speed of processor, data storage, and communication resources. The formidable deep learning model with millions or even billions of parameters suffers from enormous storage, memory bandwidth, and computational cost. On the other hand, training such a large-scale model on edge node side is also timeconsuming for getting good performance. Thus, the deep learning model is very difficult to embedded into edge nodes.
After discarding connections with low-absolute weight, the small-scale compressive deep learning model is very suitably deployed into edge nodes for learning tasks in the edge computing. Specially, the compressive model can still achieve good performance while saving computational time and memory storage. The edge node connected to the compressive model can provide service API for the near IoT devices. IoT devices have black-box access to the API for enhanced services.
However, recent attacks enable sensitive information extraction of training dataset from the model [19] , [20] . The membership inference attack can infer whether a certain record is used for training the model when the adversary has access to the model as black-box function [21] . For the extraction attack shown in Fig. 1 , the adversary can repeatedly query the edge node, followed by queryresponse pairs to analyze internal model parameters and then may ''replicate'' the compressive model [22] (describe in Section IV-A). Model extraction attacks can lead to privacy breach of training dataset in kernel logistic regression (KLR) models. In the KLR model, information about training dataset is composed of a part of the kernel function, which is related to parameters of the model. From the output results of the model, the adversary is capable of extracting sensitive information about training dataset [22] . Hence, the deep learning model should be looked as confidential for protecting sensitive training dataset. Differential privacy can guarantee any inference about the individual record from the output results. Recent works focus on differential privacy mechanism to address privacy exposure in recommender systems [23] , [24] , spectrum auctions [25] , [26] , and location-based systems [27] . In particular, differential privacy contributes to deep learning for privacy-preserving training dataset [28] , [29] . An algorithm perturbation with differential privacy for deep learning is proposed by Abadi et al. [28] , which offers an efficient method for preserving the deep learning model. In our service provision system, it is intuitional to protect the compressive model from revealing privacy of training dataset at first. In addition, we consider a serious scenario that the private compressive model, which is deployed into edge nodes, may be vulnerable to potential model extraction attacks. Once the adversary copies the compressive model, it means that he knows the high-absolute weight connection distribution of the original dense model. He then tries to fill up low-absolute weight connections into the compressive model and employs the above query-response pairs from the private compressive model to infer the original dense model parameters. Finally, the privacy information about training dataset may still reveal (discuss in detail in Section IV-A). Thus, the dense model is also confidential. Note that we mainly consider privacy of training dataset rather than the model in this paper. Our approach may mitigate model extraction attacks rather than prevent model extraction attacks [22] (describe in Section IV-A). We will consider this work in the future [30] .
In this paper, we design a deep-learning-based service provision system for protecting privacy and enhancing services in edge computing. In the system, the private compressive model is generated on the cloud server. The edge server (i.e., edge node) arming with the small-scale compressive model can provide services for the near IoT devices. Our contributions can be summarized as follows.
• Firstly, we propose a practical approach for building a private compressive deep learning model perturbation with differential privacy mechanism. The private compressive model is constructed on the cloud server in two steps, such as the private dense training step and the private compressive training step. In the private dense training step, we introduce the differential privacy parameter ε 1 for generating the private pretrained dense deep learning model with appropriate utility. In addition, this private dense training step mainly learns important connections with high-absolute weight, which prepares for the private compressive training process. In the private compressive training step, the differential privacy parameter ε 2 is used to construct the compressive deep learning model perturbation with differential privacy. The private compressive model is gained via compressing the private pre-trained dense model.
• Secondly, the private compressive model can uphold the trade-off between tight privacy and high utility. For getting high performance, we only execute weight pruning in the high layers near the output layer since the low layers near the input layer learn the important features of training dataset. On the other hand, in model retraining, Gaussian noise is only injected to the final compression phrase to achieve differential privacy for improving utility of the private compressive model.
• At last, the small-scale private compressive model with 1/9 of its original dense model's size can be easily deployed into edge servers. The IoT devices can have access to the near edge server rather than the remote cloud server. Due to reducing latency and saving bandwidth consumption, the edge server enables enhanced services for the near IoT devices. In addition, we implement a set of experiments on MNIST dataset. Experimental results show that our private compressive model has high performance when providing rigorous privacy. We focus on influence of small probability constant δ, privacy parameters ε 1 and ε 2 on performance of the private compressive model. Larger ε 2 = 6 leads to a larger scale of ε 1 = 6, 0.8 picked when δ = 10 −5 . Train and test accuracies of the private compressive model can reach 96.3% and 95.8%, 95.0% and 92.0%, respectively. Compared with train and test accuracies of the dense model with no privacy constraints and with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy (i.e., 98.0% and 98.2%, 95.5% and 97.2%), the private compressive model with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy enables high utility (i.e., 96.3% and 95.8%) via pruning the private dense model with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy. We also test our approach on CIFAR-10 dataset. On the other hand, compared our approach with the approach presented by Abadi et al. in [28] , our private compressive model performs well when trained by MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce related work. In Section III, we describe the technical preliminaries including deep learning and differential privacy. We present our deep-learning-based provision service system and an approach for generating a private compressive deep learning model perturbation with differential privacy in Section IV. We perform comprehensive experiments to verify the trade-off between privacy and utility of our approach in Section V. In Section VI, we conclude this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Deep learning based on neural networks is over-parametrized, which is not practically deployed into edge servers in edge computing. Apparently, recent works tend to concentrate more on exploring redundant parameters of the deep learning model. Generally, the intuitive notion is to reduce directly the complexity of networks by pruning parameters. Parameters pruning has been used widely to mitigate the computation complexity and memory usage. Meanwhile, it can also address the over-fitting problem. Cun [33] , [34] .
Recent attacks can exploit the implications to extract sensitive information about training dataset from the model [19] , [20] . Hence, deep learning models should be regarded as privacy-preserving due to the sensitive training dataset.
Differential privacy has been widely used for a strong standard privacy guarantee on aggregate databases [35] , [36] . Differential privacy for learning algorithms has also been studied for preserving privacy of training dataset. The released classifier is sanitization with differential privacy, which is known as output perturbation approach [37] , [38] . Laplace noise is directly used to perturb parameters of the classifier. The above method has a strong effect on utility of the learning model. Additive Gaussian noise to the training process for achieving differential privacy is another way to perturb the deep learning model [28] , [29] . The learning model perturbation with differential privacy can get good performance. Abadi et al. introduce the learning method via distorting the average gradient of a batch composed of several of examples for protecting a single data in the training dataset [28] . Opposed to [28] , the private federal learning algorithm aims to ensure the whole training dataset's privacy of the local client through distorting sum of parameter updates, which are uploaded from all clients [29] .
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a subfield of cryptography to privately computer over the union data owned between multiple parties [39] . The result of the computation is only shared without revealing other input data information. MPC can provide privacy guarantee for the intermediate data in deep learning whereas not protect the deep learning model. Hence, the private algorithm is presented via combining MPC with DP for preserving privacy both of the intermediate data and the deep learning model [40] . However, we should consider carefully the efficiency of MPC.
In our work, we compress the deep learning model via removing connections with low-absolute weight similar to the method [33] , [34] . The private compressive model is sanitized by differential privacy, whose sensitivity is calibrated motivated by the method [28] .
III. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we first offer a brief introduction to deep learning. Secondly, we describe differential privacy mechanism. In this paper, we use differential privacy mechanism for protecting privacy of training dataset in deep learning.
A. DEEP LEARNING
Deep learning (DL) is usually the multilayer neural network, in particular, with multiple hidden layers [35] , [41] . There may be hundreds of millions of parameters in a typical deep learning system trained by hundreds of millions of training dataset. Deep learning performs extremely well by forwardpropagation and back-propagation. We get output value of the input dataset via forward-propagation and then compute the loss function. Back-propagation updates the parameter (i.e., weight and bias) of these multilayers to accomplish training works.
Deep learning can be converted to an optimization problem, which have almost exclusively depended on the mini-batch stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for optimization [42] . Back-propagation applies the chain rule for derivatives to compute the gradient of the loss function. Once these gradients have been calculated, weights can be modified appropriately. Generally, the loss function is defined as
Our goal is finding the small loss with respect to the set of weights denoted as t at training t step when taking D = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N } as the input training dataset. In SGD, at t step, a batch B randomly composed of l examples are collected to compute the average
Finally, weights at t +1 step are updated by computing t − η t g t at t step.
Deep learning can effectively achieve many complex learning tasks, particularly, supervised learning tasks. In this paper, we focus on the setting of supervised machine learning. For example, a classification is built by the labeled training dataset and infers a corresponding category when a new unlabeled example comes.
B. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy (DP) has been mathematically applied to protect privacy of the sensitive information in various domains, in particular, deep learning.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy):
A randomized mechanism M : X → Y with domain X and range Y achieves
for all outcomes S ⊆ Y and each pair datasets D, D ∈ X which differ in at most one record denoted by D 1 D . Dwork et al. [43] propose the original ε-differential privacy. This loose definition (show in Definition 1) agrees that rigorous ε-differential privacy can be broken with probability δ. We expect that δ is smaller than 1 |D| , where |D| refers to the number of the dataset D.
The adversary can hardly obtain sensitive information about a single record from the result of the output even if he gets all the information of D except for the record. That is, differential privacy will guarantee privacy of the individual record if removing or replacing it in D. ε bounds the differential privacy level. Smaller ε leads to tighter privacy protection.
Definition 2 (Global Sensitivity): A differential privacy mechanism takes a dataset D as input and outputs a query algorithm f :
f is denotes as the magnitude of the maximum L 2 norm change in the outcome of the function on all possible pair of D and D .
Gaussian Mechanism: One principal method for achieving differential privacy is to add Gaussian noise to the real-valued output function f . The Gaussian mechanism can be denoted by a dataset D = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N }, a function f , the global sensitivity f , and the privacy parameter ε.
Theorem 1: For any output function f : 2 ) with mean 0 and standard deviation f · σ .
In this paper, we use differential privacy achieved by Gaussian mechanism to generate the private compressive model for preserving privacy of training dataset in deep learning.
IV. DEEP-LEARNING-BASED SERVICE PROVISION SYSTEM
In this section, we first introduce our deep-learning-based service provision system in edge computing in Section IV-A. Furthermore, in Section IV-B, we describe our approach in detail for building a private compressive deep learning model, which is practically deployed into edge servers.
A. OVERVIEW
The focus of our work is to design a deep-learning-based service provision system for preserving training dataset's privacy and providing enhanced services for IoT devices in edge computing (show in Fig. 2(a) ). The centralized cloud server first uses our proposed approach (show in Fig. 2(b) ) to FIGURE 2. Deep-learning-based service provision system. The private compressive DL model is generated in two steps on the cloud server side: In the private dense training step, cloud server uses its private dataset to train the private pre-trained dense DL model with (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy; (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy is introduced to achieve privacy protection in the private compressive training step. Finally, the compressive model sanitization with differential privacy mechanism is generated via pruning the private dense model. The compressive model has the trade-off between tight privacy and high utility. Furthermore, the small-scale private compressive model can be practically deployed into edge servers. Edge servers offer commercial deep-learning-based services to the near IoT devices for learning tasks. In particular, IoT devices can get enhance services instead of directly access to the centralized cloud server.
train the private compressive deep learning model via compressing the private pre-trained dense deep learning model. In our paper, a dense learning model means a uncompressed learning model [44] (illustrate in Fig. 2(b) ). After the training phase, we deploy the private compressive model into edge servers. Edge servers can provide commercial deep-learningbased services to the near IoT devices.
In the conventional centralized cloud architecture, IoT devices are far from the cloud. However, IoT devices can offload computational tasks to the near edge server in edge computing. Hence, the IoT devices can get improved services from the near edge server rather than the centralized cloud. For instance, as shown in Fig. 3 , there are two edge servers connected to the compressive convolutional neural network (CNN) model. The CNN is well-suited to implement image recognition tasks. Assume that there are four IoT devices. Each device has many images which need to be handled at same time for image recognition tasks. We use E i , (i = 1, 2) to denote the edge server. Let 4 ) upload their images to the cloud. It is ineffective for the remove cloud to process a large number of tasks simultaneously. Instead of the centralized cloud, the edge server can provide services for the near IoT devices. In other words, massive tasks are distributively processed by the close proximity of the edge server. Due to reducing latency and saving bandwidth consumption, the edge server can provide enhance services for the near IoT devices.
1) THREAT MODEL
In our system, we assume edge server is honest. The compressive deep learning model is deployed into edge server. Edge server can provide service API to IoT devices. IoT devices query edge servers for learning tasks via API. A single adversary can also have access to API as a black-box function but no prior knowledge of the compressive model's parameters or training dataset. Thus, the adversary enables sensitive information extraction about training dataset. In particular, the adversary may even launch extraction attacks (show in Fig. 1 ). Extraction attacks abuse API for a set of require-response pairs of the compressive model. The adversary aims to extract internal parameters of the model and then ''copie'' a new model with very similar performance as the compressive model. Confidential training dataset's information leakage from the ''copied'' model can possibly happen.
As a result, the adversary is enable to extract sensitive information about individuals, who contribute to training dataset, from the compressive model when querying edge server. Instead of the compressive model, we concern here is privacy of training dataset which individuals provide. Our goal is that no adversary know whether a single record in training dataset or not. Note that we consider that the compressive model is confidential due to the sensitive training dataset.
Furthermore, the original dense model is also confidential due to the confidential training dataset. The compressive model stems from the original dense model by removing lowabsolute weight connections so that the compressive model can reflect high-absolute weight connection distribution of the original dense model. Unfortunately, once ''stealing'' the private compressive model (i.e., the adversary successfully executes exaction attacks), the adversary may infer internal parameters of the original dense model by attempting to add low-absolute weight connections to the private compressive model and then using query-response pairs from the private compressive model to train the dense model. The adversary may further extract sensitive information about training dataset from the parameters of the dense model. Ultimately, privacy of training dataset reveals.
As mentioned previously, training dataset is subject to privacy violation. Hence, rigorous training dataset's privacy is supposed to guarantee. On the one hand, the compressive model should be confidential. According to the theory of differential privacy, the adversary cannot know a single record in or not in dataset through owning full auxiliary information except for this record. We employ differential privacy mechanism to perturb the compressive model during the private compressive training step for protecting each example in training dataset. However, only protecting privacy of the compressive model is far from enough. Privacy of training dataset may reveal due to the original dense model as shown in the above part. On the other hand, the original dense model should be protected. Differential privacy is used to distort the dense model for preserving training dataset's privacy in the private dense training step. We briefly outline the privacy-preserving phase in the next part (i.e., Private Dense Training and Private Compressive Training).
Note that our approach may relieve model extraction attacks while no resisting model extraction attacks [22] . Differential privacy mechanism is used to guarantee that the adversary cannot determine whether a special record in training dataset. In other words, differential privacy enables preserving training dataset's privacy. Hence, the ability of the adversary to extract information about training dataset will get weak when the adversary sends query to API for response because it is difficult for the adversary to know whether the record in or not in training dataset. For example, membership inference attacks focus on determining whether a record in or not in training dataset when given a machine learning model and a record. As a result, the difficulty of ''replication'' the model increases so that the membership inference attacks are hard to execute successfully. Furthermore, our approach can also mitigate other extraction attacks. Unfortunately, it will be hard to prevent extraction attacks if the adversary can constantly get query-response pairs to analyze and then may ''steal'' our model via API. We will deal with this work of preventing model extraction attacks [30] for further study. Fig. 2(b) shows the workflow of our approach to build a private compressive model in two steps, such as the private dense training step and the private compressive training step. For privacy-preserving training datasets, we incorporate differential privacy mechanism both in the dense training step and the compressive training step. Cloud server first takes its private datasets collected from IoT devices as input and outputs the differential privacy compressive model with high performance. The small-scale private compressive model with the small size of parameters is practical to deployed into edge servers at the same time providing paid commercial services to the near IoT devices for learning tasks. Specially, for several real-time applications, edge servers can directly process tasks for the near IoT devices. Hence, these IoT devices can get enhanced services instead of straightly access to the remote cloud server.
On the cloud server side, we discuss two privacy parameters ε 1 and ε 2 , each being used in the private dense training step and the private compressive training step for preserving privacy of training dataset. ε 1 and ε 2 limit the privacy bound, which differential privacy can provide. ε 1 and ε 2 are utilized to build the private pre-trained dense deep learning model and the private compressive deep learning model, respectively.
2) PRIVATE DENSE TRAINING
As aforementioned, the original dense deep learning model is confidential so that ε 1 is introduced in the private dense training process. We get the private pre-trained dense deep learning model perturbation with (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy, which is achieved by Gaussian mechanism (See Section III-B). On the other hand, this private dense training step mainly learns important connections with high-absolute weight of the dense model, which prepares for the following private compressive training process. Therefore, we train the private dense model with appropriate accuracy rather than very high accuracy. Smaller ε 1 means larger noise injected in the private dense training step, which enables tighter privacy while lower accuracy of the private dense model. Furthermore, it has a strong effect on the connection distribution of the private dense model. This may lead to pruning many important connections (i.e., connections with high-absolute weight) in the private compressive training step. Accuracy of the private compressive model decreases. In other words, smaller ε 1 yields lower utility of the private compressive model. Hence, ε 1 can be larger so that smaller noise is added to the dense model, which has ignorable effect on performance of the private compressive model while guaranteeing privacy of the pre-trained dense model.
3) PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE TRAINING
In the private compressive training step, we take the private pre-trained dense deep learning model as input and output the private compressive deep learning model. The private compressive model is generated via pruning low-absolute weight connections of the private dense model. As mentioned above, the compressive model should be privacy-preserving. Therefore, ε 2 is used for obfuscating the compressive model. Ultimately, the private compressive deep learning model is constructed sanitization with (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy mechanism. We notice that ε 2 should be chosen carefully because ε 2 directly influences utility of the private compressive model. Smaller ε 2 leads to larger noise added to the private compressive training step, which guarantees rigorous private of the compressive model while sacrificing its accuracy. The private compressive model is supposed to uphold the trade-off between tight privacy and high performance.
B. OUR APPROACH
In the first part, we train the private pre-trained dense deep learning model with appropriate performance. In the second part, the private compressive deep learning model is constructed via compressing the above private dense model. The private compressive model has rigorous privacy as well as high utility. At the last part, we present brief privacy analysis to justify that the private compressive model gives differential privacy.
1) PRIVATE PRE-TRAINED DENSE DEEP LEARNING MODEL
In the private dense training step, we aim to obtain a pre-trained dense model (illustrate in Algorithm 1) while finding the important network connections (i.e., the connections with large-absolute weight) by SGD. The dense model is perturbed by (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy, which is accomplished by Gaussian mechanism with mean 0 and standard deviation S f · σ d .
σ d is picked motivated by [28] as follows:
c is a constant. N is the whole size of the input training dataset. T d is the maximum number of the training iteration in the private dense training step. To train every training example several times, T d N /l d holds. δ is defined in Definition 1. ε 1 offers privacy protection for the dense model while influencing performance of the private compressive model as aforementioned. In this paper, we define a lot composed l d of training example denoted as L, which is different from a batch. The lot size of training examples are used to add Gaussian noise for satisfying differential privacy mechanism (show in Algorithm 1) while the batch is used to compute the gradient. For small additive noise, a lot is composed of several batches.
In SGD, at t training iteration step, the gradient is g t (x i ) corresponding to the individual example x i as follows:
To satisfy (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy guarantee of the dense model, we first bound influence of each example on g t (x i ). We define the gradient bound as G that scales each gradient g t (x i ) for deep learning to be no larger than the required size: 
9 return the private pre-trained dense deep learning model pd with (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy where g t (x i ) 2 is the L 2 norm format of g t (x i ). Therefore, the sensitivity of g t (x i ) is G.
In the private dense training process, a lot L randomly composed of l d examples are grouped for adding Gaussian noise. g n d t is then perturbation by Gaussian mechanism to realize (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy.
where g n d t realizes weight update for getting the private dense model (show in Algorithm 1).
2) PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE DEEP LEARNING MODEL
We build the (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy compressive deep learning model (illustrate in Algorithm 2) in the private compressive training step, which is composed of Weight pruning and Model retraining (show in Fig. 4 ). We define a compression operation as one Model retraining after one Weight pruning. Weight pruning is used to delete connections with low-absolute weight before retraining the model. For getting high utility, Model retraining is significantly required after weight pruning (see experimental results in Section V-C.3). 
a: WEIGHT PRUNING
After getting the private pre-trained dense model, we remove connections with low-absolute weight based on the Taylor expansion [44] . We define a hyper parameter t d . In our paper, connections, with which absolute-value weight is lower than t d , will be deleted from the private dense model before model retaining. In addition, the low layers near the input layer, for example convolution layers in the convolutional neural network, learn the important features of training dataset. We observe pruning theses layers' connections will lead to low-accuracy of the deep learning model. Furthermore, connections of the convolution layer account for a small part of all the whole network. Thus we only execute weight pruning in the high layers near the output layer, such as fully connected layers.
b: MODEL RETRAINING
Given accuracy of the private compressive deep learning model, Gaussian noise is only injected to the final compression process to achieve differential privacy. In other words, we only provide privacy preservation in the last Model retraining (see in Fig. 4) .
In the private compression training process, the private compressive deep learning model is generated perturbation with (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy.
At each j (0 < j < k, k is the total size of compression) compression, a batch B randomly including l examples are grouped to work out the average gradient g t without privacy constraints as follows:
Weights can be updated according to g t (show in Algorithm 2). 4 Pick l random samples
Pick l p random samples
At the final j = k compression, a lot L randomly containing l p examples are gathered to compute the private average gradient g n p t with differential privacy as follows:
where g n p t is used to implement weight update (show in Algorithm 2).
σ p is determined strongly by ε 2 showed in Eq. (8). We should pick ε 2 cautiously for an attractive trade-off between privacy and utility. Note that T p is actually T p k denoted in Algorithm 2.
3) PRIVACY ANALYSIS
According to THEOREM 1 in Abadi et al. [28] , our Algorithm 1 gives (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy when
. In other words, the private dense deep learning model satisfies (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy. The proof process of Algorithm 1 can be omitted because it is as same as that in [28] . However, due to the pruning operation in the private compressive training process, a part of connections of the private dense model are pruned. As a result, (ε 1 , δ)-differential privacy mechanism is broken. In Algorithm 2, the privacy-preserving mechanism is executed in the last Model retraining. Thus, our Algorithm 2 gives (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy when σ p ≥ c
. Due to the proof process as same as that in [28] , we also omit the proof process. Eventually, the private compressive deep learning model upholds (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy.
In addition, the size of the private compressive model can be equal to 1/9 of the dense model's when trained by MNIST dataset. From experimental results in Section V, we can see that the private compressive model with (6, 10 −5 )-differential VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 5. Convolutional neural network architecture. privacy enables high utility (i.e., 96.3 % and 95.8 % for train and test accuracies) via compressing the private dense model with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate our proposed approach. Firstly, we describe the experimental dataset and the baseline model in Section V-A. In Section V-B, we discuss the experimental metrics. We mainly observe influence of different parameters on performance of the private compressive model in Section V-C. Finally, we compare our approach with the approach in [28] in Section V-D.
A. EXPERIMENTAL DATASETS AND BASELINE MODEL
We use TensorFlow framework [45] , [46] to train the deep learning model. We evaluate our approach on the MNIST dataset [47] and CIFAR-10 dataset [48] . The MNIST dataset is composed of 60,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples of handwritten digits formatted as 28 × 28 gray images in the range [0-9]. The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 50,000 training examples and 10,000 testing examples. The examples are 32 × 32 color images with three channels. They can be classified into 10 classes.
Due to maintaining local image relations, the convolutional neural network (CNN) is a very popular architecture used for image recognition tasks. Hence, we implement the experiment with the dense CNN (i.e., the uncompressed CNN). We design a dense CNN as our baseline model. As shown in Fig. 5 , the dense CNN contains two convolutional (Conv) layers and three fully connected (FC) layers. The Conv, and pooling (Pool) layers enable feature extraction when an image is fed into a CNN. The rectified linear unit (ReLU) function is used for fast training. The CNN framework is used in this experiment as follows:
• The first Conv1 layer uses 6 filters with size 5 × 5 and followed by a ReLU function and a 2 × 2 max Pool layer;
• The second Conv2 layer uses 16 filters with size 5 × 5 and followed by a ReLU function and a 2 × 2 max Pool layer;
• The first FC1 layer which is fully connected to the above Pool layer has 120 outputs and followed by a ReLU function;
• The second FC2 layer has 84 outputs and followed by a ReLU function;
• The third FC3 layer has 10 outputs;
• The softmax layer is the output layer with 10 outputs. A CNN takes an image example as input and outputs a vector of probabilities for a set of classes. Then the input image gets a class label with the highest probability. The CNN is constructed to train MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets as we previously mentioned. Parameters (i.e., weight and bias) of the CNN are mainly composed of those of FC layers. In our CNN, FC layers have more than 59k parameters (i.e., 59, 134 = (400 + 1) × 120 + (120 + 1) × 84 + (84 + 1) × 10). Thus, the size of the dense DNN's parameters is about 60k. The dense CNN model (i.e., the baseline model) can achieve train accuracy of 98.0 % and test accuracy of 98.2 % (illustrate in Fig. 6 ) when trained by MNIST dataset without any privacy constraints. 
B. EXPERIMENTAL METRICS
We mainly evaluate influence of different parameters, such as lot size l p , learning rate η t , gradient bound G, small probability constant δ, privacy parameters ε 1 and ε 2 , on performance of the private compressive model. Parameters, i.e., l p and η t , are used in Algorithm 2 for obtaining the private compressive model with good performance during the training process. Parameter ε 1 utilized in Algorithm 1 provides privacy preservation for the dense model and has an indirect effect on the performance of the private compressive model. In particular, parameters, i.e., G, δ, and ε 2 , are picked carefully in Algorithm 2 for guaranteeing the private compressive model with an attractive trade-off between privacy and utility. 
C. INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS ON PERFORMANCE OF PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE MODEL 1) RESULTS OF PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE MODEL IN LIGHT OF l, η t , AND G FOR MNIST
Firstly, we investigate performance of the dense model with no privacy constraints. The private dense model perturbation with (ε 1 = 1, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy is trained. We compress the private dense model and get the compressive model without privacy constraints. We observe utility of the compressive model.
From Fig. 6 Secondly, for finding the appropriate l p , η t , and G used in Algorithm 2, we study influence of l p , η t and G on utility of the private compressive model perturbation with (ε 2 = 6, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy via pruning and retraining the private dense model with (ε 1 = 1, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy in Fig. 7, Fig. 8, and Fig. 9 .
In Fig. 7 , we examine the impact of l p on performance of the private compressive model with different G = 0.10, 0.15 respectively when setting fix values of η t = 0.01 and T = 5000. Fig. 7 reports that the private compressive model performs stably (accuracies of about 91.0 % respectively for train and test) when l p = 400. In Fig. 8 , we investigate influence of η t on accuracy of the private compressive model with different l p = 400, 500 when setting fix values of G = 0.10 and T = 5000. We find that the private compressive model has higher utility (accuracies of above 92.0 % respectively for train and test) when η t = 0.01.
Gaussian noise size is closely related to the value of G showed in Eq. (7). G has a direct impact on performance of the private compressive model. Thus, G is an important factor concerned in our experiments. In Fig. 9 , we observe the effect of gradient bound G on performance of the private compressive model protected by (ε 2 = 6, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy when setting different l p = 400, 500 and fix η t = 0.01 and T = 5000. Fig. 9 shows the private compressive model achieves accuracies of about 90.0 % respectively for both of train and test. We select G = 0.10 because the private compressive model gets the highest accuracies of around 92.0 % respectively for train and test.
Compared Fig. 7, Fig. 8 , Fig. 9 with Fig. 6 , we observe that the private compressive model can perform well when differential privacy introduced in the model retraining phase. We find appropriate l p = 400, η t = 0.01, and G = 0.10 by measuring train and test accuracies of the private compressive model (particularly, highest accuracies of about 93.0 % and about 92.0 % respectively for train and test).
2) RESULTS OF PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE MODEL IN LIGHT OF δ FOR MNIST
In this section, we mainly study influence of different δ on performance of the private compressive model. Fig. 10 shows accuracy of the private compressive model for different selections of δ via pruning the private dense model with (ε 1 = 1, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. The highest accuracies are achieved (train and test accuracies of 95.5 % and 95.4 %, 95.3 % and 95.6 %, 96.5 % and 95.8 % for different δ = 10 −6 , 10 −5 , 10 −4 , respectively) when largest ε 2 = 6 is selected. Accuracies of the private compressive model change much smaller for fixed ε 2 and different δ than for fixed δ and different ε 2 . The compressive model suffers from larger performance loss when ε 2 is set from 6 to 0.5. The reason is that the additive Gaussian noise to the compressive model increases greatly when ε 2 is small (ε 2 < 1), which has a strong effect on performance of the private compressive model. In our approach, we empirically pick δ = 10 −5 .
3) RESULTS OF PRIVATE PRE-TRAINED DENSE MODEL IN LIGHT OF ε 1 FOR MNIST ε 1 is used in Algorithm 1 to generate the pre-trained private dense model while leading to utility loss of the dense model. Hence, model retraining phase is very important for improving performance of the compressive model. In this section, we also examine accuracy of the compressive model without differential privacy introduced in model retraining phase.
Compared Fig. 11(a) with Fig. 12 (a), smaller ε 1 (i.e., ε 1 = 0.8) guarantees tighter privacy while yielding lower utility (i.e., accuracies of about 90.0 % respectively for train and test) of the private dense model. by compressing the dense model with (ε 1 = 6, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. As we can see in Fig. 12(a) , the compressive model gets train and test accuracies of 92.0 % and 90.0 % via compressing the dense model with (ε 1 = 0.8, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. Hence, smaller ε 1 results in lower performance of the compressive model. Fortunately, due to model retraining, we can see performance of the compressive model with no privacy constraints can be good as the private dense model. This proves that the retraining phase is a major step for the compressive model getting high utility. 
5) RESULTS OF PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE MODEL IN LIGHT OF ε 2 FOR MNIST
The private compressive model can be pruned to 1/9 of the original dense model's size. Experimental results prove that the private compressive model perturbation with differential privacy enables high utility while offering rigorous privacy. ε 2 is used for preserving privacy of the compressive model. ε 2 affects strongly the trade-off between privacy and utility of the private compressive model. Fig. 13 shows performance of the private compressive model under varying privacy level (i.e., different ε 2 = 6, 1, 0.5 and fix δ = 10 −5 ) by pruning the dense model with (ε 1 = 6, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. Train and test accuracies of the private compressive model can reach about 95.0 % respectively under different T (i.e., T p k ) when ε 2 = 6, 1, respectively. As expected, for larger ε 2 , the private compressive model performs better. However, for smaller ε 2 = 0.5 (ε 2 < 1), performance of the private compressive model gets worse, specially, for large T = 10000. On the one hand, σ p is large if T (T = 10000) is large and ε 2 (ε 2 < 1) is small (see in Eq. (8)). Larger σ p leads to larger additive Gaussian noise size (see in Eq. (7)). On the other hand, Gaussian noise is injected to each epoch in the private compressive training. Large T makes large epoches and large noise size. Thus, Large T means the large size of noise added in the private compressive training, which leads to serious loss of utility. ε 2 has a direct and significant effect on accuracy of the private compressive model, which is used for providing the trade-off between privacy and utility. ε 2 should be selected carefully. Fig. 14 shows performance of the private compressive model under varying privacy level (i.e., ε 2 = 6, 1, 0.5 and δ = 10 −5 ) by pruning the dense model with (ε 1 = 0.8, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. Train and test accuracies of the private compressive model can both achieve about 92.0 % under various T when ε 2 = 6. Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show that large ε 2 = 6 leads to a large scale of ε 1 = 6, 0.8 picked when setting fix δ = 10 −5 . Train and test accuracies of the private compressive model can reach 96.3% and 95.8%, 95.0% and 92.0%, respectively. Compared with train and test accuracies of the dense model with no privacy constraints and with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy (i.e., 98.0 % and 98.2 %, 95.5 % and 97.2 %), the private compressive model perturbation with (6, 10 −5 )-differential privacy enables high utility (i.e., train and test accuracies of 96.3% and 95.8%). Small ε 2 = 0.5 (ε 2 < 1) yields a small scale of ε 1 = 6 chosen when δ = 10 −5 . The private compressive model gets train and test accuracies of 93.8% and 95.6% for T = 2000. Thus, smaller ε 2 guarantees tighter privacy while suffering from more utility loss.
6) RESULTS OF PRIVATE COMPRESSIVE MODEL IN LIGHT OF ε 1 AND ε 2 FOR CIFAR-10
In this section, we evaluate influence of different privacy levels on performance of the private compressive model, whose size of parameters can be equal to 1/5 of the dense model's when CIFAR-10 dataset is trained in the experiments. We set l p = 3000, η t = 0.01, G = 0.10 and T = 2000. Fig. 15(a) shows utility of the private compressive model with different ε 2 = 10, 8, 6, 3 and fix δ = 10 −5 when we compress the private dense model with (ε 1 = 10, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy. The private compressive model perturbation with (ε 2 , δ)-differential privacy can reach higher accuracy for larger ε 2 (i.e., ε 2 = 10, 8, 6). In particular, our approach can achieve accuracies of about 70.0 % for both of train and test. However, small ε 2 (i.e., ε 2 = 3) leads to performance degradation. Smaller ε 2 results in larger additive Gaussian noise, which decreases more performance of the private compressive model. After compressing the private dense model with (ε 1 = 8, δ = 10 −5 )-differential privacy, we can see performance of the private compressive model with different ε 2 = 10, 8, 6, 3 and fix δ = 10 −5 in Fig. 15(b) . From Fig. 15(b) , we can also observe that the private compressive model with larger ε 2 performs better. Comparing Fig. 15(a) with Fig. 15(b) , the private compressive model with larger ε 1 = 10 outperforms that with smaller ε 1 = 8 when setting fix ε 2 . Because of larger noise adding to the dense model, it has a stronger effect on the important connection distribution in the dense model. As a result, some important connections may be deleted. This leads to performance reduction of the private compressive model. In summary, smaller ε 1 yields stronger privacy of the dense model while leading to lower accuracy of the private compressive model. Therefore, we should take appropriate ε 1 into consideration. ε 1 can be picked larger for protecting privacy of the original dense model while getting higher utility of the compressive model. Furthermore, ε 2 directly determines the trade-off between privacy and utility of the private compressive model. ε 1 and ε 2 should be selected carefully. For maintaining high performance of the private compressive model, we can take larger ε 1 and appropriate ε 2 .
D. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we execute a set of experiments on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Abadi et al. propose the approach for building the private dense model, which offers differential privacy [28] . Unlike the approach [28] , we present our approach for constructing the private compressive model perturbation with differential privacy. As shown in Fig. 16 , performance of our private compressive model is compared with the private dense model [28] , under different privacy levels. We set privacy level ε = 6, 1, 0.8 for MNIST dataset and ε = 10, 8 for CIFAR-10 dataset, with δ = 10 −5 each. Fig. 16(a) and Fig. 16(b) show accuracy of the private model versus different privacy level ε when MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset are trained respectively in the experiments. Fig. 16(a) shows that our approach can perform as well as the approach [28] . They can get train and test accuracies of above 90.0 %. As shown in Fig. 16(b) , our approach and the approach [28] have similar performance. Train and test accuracies are about 70.0 %. Fig. 16 reports that our smallscale private compressive model has good performance as the private dense model [28] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present our deep-learning-based provision service system for providing privacy protection and enhanced services in the edge computing. An approach for generating a private compressive deep learning model with differential privacy guarantee is proposed on the cloud server side. For privacy protection, our approach performs the private dense training step and the private compressive training step, where the dense model and compressive model are preserved by differential privacy, respectively. The private compressive model is generated via compressing the private dense model. The small-scale private compressive model can be practically embedded into edge servers, which can offer enhanced services to the near IoT devices. Our experiments show that the generated private compressive model has high performance while upholding tight privacy.
